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Abstract  Cosmology differs in some respects significantly from other sciences, primarily 
because of its intimate association with issues of a conceptual and philosophical nature. 
Because cosmology in the broader sense relates to the students’ world views, it provides a 
means for bridging the gap between the teaching of science and the teaching of 
humanistic subjects. Students should of course learn to distinguish between what is right 
and wrong about the science of the universe. No less importantly, they should learn to 
recognize the limits of science and that there are questions about nature that may forever 
remain unanswered. Cosmology, more than any other science, is well suited to illuminate 
issues of this kind. 
 
1. Introduction 
Whether majoring in science or not, students at high school and undergraduate 
university level are confronted with issues of cosmology, a subject which has only 
attracted a limited amount of attention in the context of science education (Kragh 
2011a). It is important that when students are introduced to cosmology, this is 
done correctly not only in the technical sense but also in a conceptual sense. As 
shown by several studies, misconceptions abound in both areas. They include 
some of the philosophical aspects that are so closely intertwined with cosmology 
in the wider sense and to which a large part of cosmology’s popular appeal can be 
attributed. These aspects need to be addressed and coordinated with the more 
standard, scientific aspects. In this respect it is often an advantage to refer not only 
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to the modern big bang theory but also to older developments that may illuminate 
modern problems in cosmology in a simple and instructive manner.  
 Following a brief discussion of the development of cosmology as a science, 
the article focuses on various conceptual misunderstandings that are commonly 
found in students’ ideas about modern cosmology. Some of these misconceptions 
are of a philosophical nature, for example related to the concept of the universe 
and its supposed birth in a big bang. By taking issues of this kind seriously, 
students will hopefully be brought to reflect on the limits of science and adopt a 
critical attitude to what scientific cosmology can tell us about the universe. 
 
2. Early Cosmology: Lessons for Science Education 
According to the view of most physicists and astronomers, and also according to 
some historians of science (Brush 1992), cosmology became a science only in the 
twentieth century. Some will say that the supposed turn from ‘philosophical’ to 
truly scientific cosmology only occurred with the discovery of the cosmic 
microwave background radiation in 1965, while others date the turn to Edwin 
Hubble’s insight in the late 1920s of the cosmological significance of the galactic 
redshifts. Others again suggest that the turning point is to be found in Einstein’s 
cosmological model of 1917 based on his general theory of relativity.  
 The widely held opinion that there was no scientific cosmology – scientific 
in more or less the modern sense of the term – before Einstein and Hubble entered 
the stage is reflected in most introductory textbooks in physics and astronomy. 
The general structure of these books is to start with the solar system and then 
proceed to stars and galaxies, ending with the universe as a whole. The chapters 
on cosmology are usually restricted to post-1920 developments (Krauskopf & 
Beiser 2000). Although earlier developments are sometimes included, then it 
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occurs in sections that appear separate from the account of modern cosmology and 
are typically placed in the beginning of the book. For example, the epic 
confrontation between the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic universe and the heliocentric 
world system during the so-called Copernican revolution is a classic theme in the 
teaching of physics and astronomy, where it is often presented as a 
methodological case study. On the other hand, textbooks and similar teaching 
materials rarely refer to other parts of the rich history of cosmological thought, for 
which teachers and students must look up the literature written by historians of 
science (North 1994, Kragh 2007). The exception to this state of affairs is Olbers’ 
famous paradox of the dark night sky, dating from 1826 but with roots back to 
Kepler, which can be found in most textbooks. 
 Although modern cosmology dates in most respects from the early part of 
the twentieth century, it does not follow that earlier theories about the universe 
were not scientific. The cosmos of the ancient Greeks was very different from ours, 
yet Ptolemy’s cosmology was basically scientific in so far that it was a 
mathematical model that rested on observations and had testable consequences. 
At any rate, there are good reasons to include aspects of pre-Einsteinian 
cosmology also in the context of science education. For one thing, students should 
be aware of this earlier development for general cultural reasons. Moreover, the 
earlier history of cosmology provides many more examples of educational 
relevance than just the one of the Copernican revolution. Although Michael 
Crowe’s two books on theories of the universe are not ordinary textbooks, they are 
based on his very extensive experience with teaching history of astronomy and 
cosmology at the University of Notre Dame (Crowe 1990, Crowe 1994). They are of 
value to the teacher of introductory astronomy courses because they include a 
large amount of primary sources from Ptolemy to Hubble that can be easily used 
in the classroom. Moreover, Crowe (1994) includes laboratory exercises related to 
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the studies of the nebulae by William Herschel in the late eighteenth century and 
by the Earl of Rosse in the mid nineteenth century.   
 To illustrate the relevance of earlier cosmological thought in science 
education, consider the discussion in the thirteenth century concerning the 
possibility of an eternal yet created universe. The discussion was abstract and 
philosophical, not scientific, but it is nonetheless of relevance to problems of 
modern cosmology because it led the scholastic thinkers to scrutinize the concept 
of creation in a sophisticated way that went beyond the identification of creation 
with temporal beginning (Carroll 1998, see also Sect. 6.4). As another example one 
might point to the difficult problem of spatial and material infinity as it turned up 
in Newton’s correspondence with Richard Bentley in the early 1690s. Both Bentley 
and Edmund Halley mistakenly believed that in an infinite stellar universe each 
star would be attracted by equal forces in any direction and therefore be in a state 
of equilibrium. The belief is intuitively convincing and probably shared by most 
students, but Newton knew better. As he pointed out, two infinities do not cancel. 
The case is well suited to discuss with students the tricky problems of infinities 
that appear no less prominently in modern cosmology than they did in the past. 
 Students should also be aware that the fundamental distinction between 
realism and instrumentalism, an important issue in the discussion of the nature of 
science (Campbell 1998), does not only turn up in microphysics but also in 
cosmology. After all, the universe is no less unobservable than are quarks and 
superstrings. No one has ever observed the universe and no one will ever do so, so 
how can we know that the universe exists? The realist will claim that ‘the 
universe’ designates an entity that exists independently of all cosmological 
enquiry, while the instrumentalist considers it a concept that can be ascribed a 
meaning only in a pragmatic sense, as it is a construct of cosmological theory. The 
tension between the two opposite views can be followed through much of the 
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history of cosmology, from Ptolemy’s world system to the modern multiverse, and 
from a teaching point of view it may sometimes be an advantage to refer to older 
sources rather than to modern examples. To illustrate cosmological or 
astronomical antirealism with regard to theories, one may read passages of 
Stephen Hawking (a positivist and instrumentalist), but the same point is brought 
home, and with greater clarity, by Andreas Osiander’s notorious preface to 
Copernicus’ De Revolutionibus. 
 
3. Patterns in the Development of Modern Cosmology 
To the extent that practicing scientists are familiar with philosophical theories of 
science, the theories are often limited to the views of Karl Popper and Thomas 
Kuhn. The ideas of these two philosophers are also likely to be the only ones that 
students will meet, either explicitly or implicitly, in physics and astronomy 
courses.  
 While historians agree that Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions does 
not in general fit very well with the actual history of science, the history of 
cosmology yields some support for the notion of paradigm-governed science and 
revolutionary changes, if not in the radical sense originally proposed by Kuhn 
(Kragh 2007, pp. 243-245). In both the older and the modern history, there are 
several cases of beliefs and traditions that formed the nearly unquestioned 
framework of cosmological thinking and hence had the character of paradigm. 
Thus, until about 1910 it was generally believed that the stellar universe was 
limited to the Milky Way. As the astronomy writer Agnes Clerke asserted, ‘No 
competent thinker, with the whole of the available evidence before him, can now, 
it is safe to say, maintain any single nebula to be a star system of coordinate rank 
with the Milky Way’ (Clerke 1890, p. 368). She added: ‘With the infinite 
possibilities beyond, science has no concern’. 
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 Likewise, until 1930 the static nature of the universe as a whole was taken 
for granted. Current cosmology is solidly founded on Einstein’s theory of general 
relativity theory and some kind of big bang scenario, elements that are largely 
beyond discussion and conceived as defining features of cosmological theory. Yet, 
although it may be tempting to characterize these beliefs as paradigmatic, they are 
so in a different sense from what Kuhn spoke of in his classical work of 1962, The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions. First of all, there is no indication of radical 
incommensurability gaps in the development that led from the static Milky Way 
universe to the current standard model of big bang cosmology.   
 The applicability of the Kuhnian model to the case of modern cosmology 
has been investigated by Marx and Bornmann (2010) by means of bibliometric 
methods. They examine what they misleadingly call ‘the transition from the static 
view of the universe to the big bang in cosmology’, a process that supposedly 
occurred in the mid-1960s when the steady state model was abandoned in favour 
of the hot big bang model. (In reality, the transition from a static to a dynamic 
universe occurred in the early 1930s and was unrelated to ideas about a big bang.) 
As indicated by bibliometric data the emergence of the victorious big bang model 
in the 1960s marked a drastic change in cosmology, if not a sudden revolution.1 
Based on citation analysis the two authors suggest that if there were a paradigm 
shift, it was a slow process ranging from about 1917 to 1965 – which cannot 
reasonably be called a paradigm shift in Kuhn’s sense. 
                                                          
1  The number of publications on cosmology grew dramatically in the 1960s, apparently an 
indication of the revolutionary effect caused by the standard big bang theory (Kaiser 2006, 
p. 447, Marx & Bornmann 2010, p. 543). However, the growth is in some respect illusory, 
as the number of publications in the physical and astronomical sciences as a whole grew 
even more rapidly. While cosmology in 1950 made up 0.4% of the physics research 
papers, in 1970 the percentage had shrunk to a little less than 0.3% (Ryan & Shepley 1976). 
Numerical data can be presented in many ways, sometimes resulting in opposite 
messages. 
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 In an earlier paper Shipman (2000) found that nearly half of his sample of 
astronomers had never heard of Kuhn and that an additional third was only 
vaguely familiar with him. Of those who were aware of Kuhn’s philosophy, 
several responded that it informed their teaching and consequently was of value 
in the classroom. One respondent said: ‘I think changing paradigms are so obvious 
in astronomical history that it goes almost without saying that his work is 
interesting to an astronomer, but I never thought to actually make a big deal of it 
in class’ (Shipman 2000, p. 165). Whereas some astronomers found Kuhn’s model 
to be helpful in understanding the development of the astronomical sciences, none 
of them thought it was relevant to their research or had an impact on modern 
astronomy and cosmology. As one astronomer responded, ‘Kuhn … has no effect 
on the way science is done’ (p. 169). 
 In this respect, the case of Popper is rather different as his falsificationist 
philosophy of science has exerted a strong and documented influence on the 
astronomical and cosmological sciences and continue to do so (Sovacool 2005, 
Kragh 2013). Although most cosmologists are only superficially acquainted with 
Popper’s ideas, which they tend to use in a simplified folklore version, they often 
invoke them as a guide for constructing and evaluating theories. This is evident 
from the modern controversy over the multiverse, and it was just as evident in the 
past, when Popperian standards played an important role in the debate between 
the steady state theory and the class of relativistic evolution theories (Kragh 1996, 
pp. 244-246). Hawking has little respect for philosophy, but in his best-selling A 
Brief History of Time he nonetheless pays allegiance to the views of Popper: 
Any physical theory is always provisional, in the sense that it is only a hypothesis: you 
can never prove it. ... On the other hand, you can disprove a theory by finding even a 
single observation that disagrees with the predictions of the theory. As philosopher of 
science Karl Popper has emphasized, a good theory is characterized by the fact that it 
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makes a number of predictions that could in principle be disproved or falsified by 
observation. (Hawking 1989, p. 11). 
Influential as Popperianism is in cosmological circles, the influence is mostly 
limited to the popular literature and general discussions of a methodological 
nature. As it is the case with Kuhn, Popper’s name very rarely appears in research 
papers. Perhaps more surprisingly, the same seems to hold for elementary 
textbooks in astronomy and cosmology. On the other hand, the influence of a 
philosopher may be visible even though his or her name is missing. Thus, in a 
brief methodological section astronomy author Karl Kuhn writes: ‘A theory of 
science must be able to be shown to be wrong. A theory must be testable. Every 
theory must be regarded as tentative, as being only the best theory we have at 
present. It must contain within itself its own possibility of destruction’ (Kuhn 
1998, p. 557). It is then up to the teacher whether Popper should be named or not. 
 
4. Conceptions and Misconceptions of Cosmology 
Most of the misconceptions about cosmology commonly found among students 
concern the two fundamental concepts of the expanding universe and the big 
bang. The two concepts are closely connected, but the precise connection between 
them is often misconceived. 
4.1. The Expanding Universe 
The standard tradition in introductory astronomy and physics textbooks dealing 
with cosmology is understandably characterized by an emphasis on observations 
rather than theory. Observations are used as arguments for new concepts and 
often presented in a historical context. Expositions typically start with two 
important and connected observations from the early decades of the twentieth 
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century, Melvin Slipher’s discovery in the 1910s of galactic redshifts and Hubble’s 
conclusion from 1929 of a linear relationship between the redshifts and the 
distances of the galaxies. Both of these historical cases are easily comprehended 
and can, moreover, be turned into students’ exercises by providing the students 
with the data used by the two astronomers, or by using the students’ own data 
found with a ‘simulated telescope’ (Marschall, Snyder & Cooper 2000). From the 
Hubble relation there is but a small step to the expanding universe. Almost 
without exception textbooks and popular expositions illustrate the expansion of 
space by means of the inflating-balloon analogy, which may also be used to 
introduce the notion of curved space such as applied in relativistic cosmology. 
This standard analogy – to ‘imagine the nebulæ to be embedded in the surface of a 
rubber balloon which is being inflated’ – was first suggested by Arthur Eddington 
in 1931, shortly after the expansion of the universe had been recognized 
(Eddington 1931). 
  Although there may be but a small step from the Hubble relation to the 
expanding universe, the step is real and should not be ignored. Students may be 
told that the expansion of the universe is an observational fact, but this is not quite 
the case. We do not observe the expansion, which does not follow from the data of 
either Hubble or later observers. As Hubble was keenly aware of, it takes 
theoretical assumptions (such that the redshifts are due to a Doppler effect) to 
translate the measured redshifts into an expansion of the universe. It is quite 
possible to accept the redshift-distance relation and, at the same time, maintaining 
that the universe is static, such as many scientists did in the 1930s and a few still 
do. In fact, Hubble, a cautious empiricist, never concluded that the universe is in a 
state of expansion. What is ‘commonly known’ and stated in many textbooks and 
articles, namely that ‘The expansion of the universe was discovered by Edwin 
Hubble in 1929’ (Lightman & Miller 1989, p. 135), is just wrong. Hubble did not 
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discover the expansion of the universe and he never claimed that he did (Kragh & 
Smith 2003).  
 There is a tendency in textbooks, perhaps understandable from a 
pedagogical perspective, to simplify and dramatize discoveries. For example, one 
textbook presents Hubble’s discovery of the redshift-distance relation as follows: 
‘The law was published in a 1929 paper on the expansion of the universe. It sent 
shock waves through the astronomical community’ (Kuhn 1998, p. 512). However, 
it is only in retrospect that Hubble’s paper was about the expansion of the 
universe, and it did not initially create a stir in either the astronomical or the 
physical community. According to the Web of Science, in the years 1929-1930 it 
received only three citations in scientific journals. 
 A much better candidate for the discoverer of the expanding cosmos is the 
Belgian pioneer cosmologist Georges Lemaître, who in a work of 1927 clearly 
argued that the universe was expanding and even calculated the quantity that 
came to be known as the Hubble constant (Holder & Mitton 2012). Contrary to 
Hubble, Lemaître was fully aware that the measured galactic redshifts are not due 
to a Doppler effect of galaxies flying through space, but must be interpreted as the 
stretching of standing waves due to the expansion of space, that is, as a relativistic 
effect. As he explained, if light was emitted when the radius of curvature of the 
closed universe was R1 and received when it had increased to R2, the ‘apparent 
Doppler effect’ would be given by Δλ/λ = R2/R1 – 1. The important difference 
between the Doppler explanation and the relativistic expanding-space explanation 
can be illustrated in a simple way by means of the balloon analogy (Lotze 1995). 
One should distinguish between the expansion of space and the expansion of the 
material universe, such as most textbooks do. It is much easier to comprehend 
galaxies moving apart, as were they flying through space, but it is more correct to 
conceive space as expanding and the galaxies changing their relative positions 
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because of the expansion of space. The counterintuitive notion of an expanding 
empty space, such as implied by the model first studied by Willem de Sitter in 
1917, illustrates the difference between the two explanations.  
 As documented by many studies, the expansion of the universe is not well 
understood, if understood at all, by either the general public or general science 
students. Comins (2001) discusses a large number of astronomical and 
cosmological misconceptions, why they are held and how to correct them.2 
Unfortunately, when it comes to the history of cosmology he expresses several 
misconceptions of his own, including that Einstein, because he included the 
cosmological constant in his 1917 cosmological model, ‘missed the opportunity to 
predict that the universe expands’ (p. 162). This common misunderstanding is 
easily seen to be unfounded, for other reasons because the cosmological constant 
was part of Lemaître’s expanding model of 1927 based on Einstein’s equations. 
Moreover, Einstein did not introduce the cosmological constant to keep his 
universe from expanding, but to keep it from collapsing. In short, a cosmological 
model may describe an expanding universe whether or not it includes a non-zero 
cosmological constant.  
 Asked whether the universe is systematically changing in size or 
remaining about the same size, nearly 60% of 1111 interviewed American adults 
offered the last response. According to the survey conducted by Lightman and 
Miller (1989) only 24% of the respondents said that the universe is expanding. 
Later large-scale surveys of students following introductory astronomy courses 
confirm that they have difficulties with the expanding universe and other concepts 
                                                          
2  See also Comins’ website on ‘Heavenly errors’ that includes nearly 1,700 common 
misconceptions that students and other people have about astronomy and cosmology. 
Among them are that the universe has stopped expanding, that there is a centre of the 
universe, and that all galaxies are moving away from the Earth 
(http://www.umephy.maine.edu/ncomins/).  
12 
 
of modern cosmology. Only a minority of the students revealed a reasonably 
correct understanding of the meaning of the ‘expansion of the universe’, and a 
sizeable minority denied that the universe is increasing in size. Instead they 
suggested that the phrase was a metaphor for how our knowledge of the universe 
has increased over time (Wallace, Prather & Duncan 2012). One student answered 
that the expanding universe is an expression for stars and planets moving away 
from a central area in the universe, if not necessarily from the Earth (Wallace, 
Prather & Duncan 2011).    
 Another question that often causes confusion is what takes part in the 
expansion. Although the expansion is ‘universal’, it does not refer to everything. 
Objects that are held together by other forces than gravity, such as electromagnetic 
and nuclear forces, remain at a fixed physical size as the universe swells around 
them. Likewise, objects in which the gravitational force is dominant also resist the 
expansion: planets, stars and galaxies are bound so strongly by gravitational forces 
that they are not expanding with the rest of the universe. There is no reason to fear 
that the distance of the Earth from the Sun will increase because of the cosmic 
expansion, although worries of this kind are not uncommon (Lightman & Miller 
1989). In the survey conducted by Prather et al. (2003), 10% of the students thought 
that the expansion of the universe has terrestrial consequences, including the 
separation of the continental plates. Nor is our Local Group of galaxies expanding. 
The Andromeda Galaxy, for example, is actually approaching the Milky Way, 
causing a blueshift rather than a redshift. (In 1912, Slipher concluded that the 
Andromeda Galaxy approached the Sun, only subsequently to realize that it was 
an exception to the general pattern of galactic redshifts.) On the other hand, on a 
cosmological scale all matter is rushing apart from all other matter at a speed 
described by Hubble’s law, v = Hr, where H denotes the Hubble parameter or 
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‘constant’. Since the Hubble time 1/H is an expression of the age of the universe, H 
it is not really a constant but a slowly decreasing quantity. 
 There are other and more complex ways in which the expansion of the 
universe can be misconceived, some of them relating to the magical limit of the 
recession velocity apparently given by the speed of light c (Davis & Lineweaver 
2004, Ellis 2007, pp. 1214-1216). Students learn that nothing can move faster than 
the speed of light, which is a fundamental postulate of the theory of relativity. But 
according to Hubble’s law the recession velocity keeps increasing with distance, 
implying that beyond the Hubble distance c/H the velocity will exceed the speed 
of light. Can receding galaxies really cross this limit? If they do, will they then 
become invisible because their redshifts become infinite? In spite of the apparent 
contradiction with Einstein’s postulate, superluminal recession velocities do not 
violate the theory of relativity. As Lemaître emphasized in 1927, the recession 
velocity is not caused by motion through space but by the expansion of space. 
According to general relativity theory, redshifts do not relate to velocities, as they 
do in the Doppler description (both classically and in special relativity), and the 
redshifts of galaxies on the Hubble sphere of radius c/H will not be infinite. 
 Not only can the universe, or space, expand faster than the speed of light, 
we can also observe objects that recede from us with speeds greater than this limit. 
Students may believe that since the universe came into being 13.8 billion years 
ago, the most distant objects are 13.8 billion light-years away, but in that case they 
think in terms of a static universe. Since distances between faraway galaxies 
increase while light travels, the observability of galaxies is given by the look-back 
time, which is the time in the past at which light now being received from a 
distant object was emitted. As a result, the farthest object we can see is currently 
about 46 billion light-years away from us, receding with more than six times the 
speed of light, and that even though the universe is only 13.8 billion years old. The 
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size of the observable universe is not given by the Hubble sphere but by the 
cosmic particle horizon beyond which we cannot receive light or other 
electromagnetic signals from the galaxies.  
4.2. The Big Bang 
Having digested the notion of expanding space, the next crucial concept that 
students need to be introduced to, the idea of the big bang, is often presented as a 
simple consequence of the cosmic expansion.3 After all, if the distances between 
galaxies (or rather galactic clusters) increase monotonically, apparently there must 
have been a time in the past when all galaxies were lumped together. This 
inference is facilitated by the balloon analogy, where the airless balloon 
corresponds to the original universe before expansion. However, the inference is 
more seductive than correct. The argument from expansion to big bang may be 
pedagogically convincing, but it is not supported by either logic or the history of 
science. If there were such a necessary connection, how is it that while the majority 
of astronomers in the 1930s accepted the expansion of the universe, practically no 
one accepted the idea of an explosive origin?  
 In the version of the ‘primeval atom’ hypothesis the idea of a big bang was 
first suggested by Lemaître in 1931 – not in his 1927 paper, as is often stated – but 
it took many years until the hypothesis was taken seriously. The hypothesis was 
independently revived and much improved by George Gamow and his 
collaborators in the late 1940s, but even then it failed to win much recognition 
(Kragh 1996, pp. 135-141). Remarkably, from 1954 to 1963 only a single research 
                                                          
3  The undignified name ‘big bang’ was coined by Fred Hoyle in a BBC radio programme 
of 1949, but neither Hoyle nor other scientists used it widely until the late 1960s. Contrary 
to what is often said (e.g., Marx & Bornmann 2010, p. 454), the phrase did not catch on 
either among supporters or opponents of the exploding universe. Hoyle belonged to the 
latter category, and it generally thought that he coined the name as a way of ridiculing the 
theory, but this is hardly the case. The first scientific paper with ‘big bang’ in its title 
appeared only in 1966. 
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paper was published on the big bang theory. During most of the period from 
about 1930 to 1960, the favoured theory of the evolution of the universe was the 
Lemaître-Eddington model according to which the universe had evolved 
asymptotically from a static Einstein state an infinity of time ago. This kind of 
model is ever-expanding but with no big bang and no definite age. 
 Teachers presumably want their students to accept the big bang theory, 
but not to do it by faith or authority. To convince students that the big bang really 
happened they need to provide good reasons to believe in it, which primarily 
means observational and other empirical evidence. In this respect the students 
may be compared to the majority of astronomers and physicists who still in the 
1950s resisted the idea of a big bang, basically because they lacked solid empirical 
evidence for the hypothesis. As the sceptics pointed out, quite reasonably, if our 
current universe has evolved from a very small and extremely dense and hot state 
several billions years ago, there must presumably still be some traces or fossils 
from it. If no such traces can be found, we have no reason to believe in the big 
bang and nor is there any possibility of testing the hypothesis.  
 An additional reason for the cool reception of the big bang theory was that 
according to most of the models, the calculated age of the universe came out 
embarrassingly small, much smaller than the age of the stars and smaller than 
even the age of the Earth. A universe that is younger than its constituent parts is of 
course ruled out for logical reasons. The age problem is mentioned in some 
astronomy textbooks, but not always historically correct. According to Arny (2004, 
p. 517), the age of Lemaître’s primeval-atom universe was 2/3 times the inverse 
Hubble constant, which at the time, when Hubble’s value H = 500 km/s/Mpc was 
generally accepted, corresponded to only 1.2 billion years. The reference should be 
to the Einstein-de Sitter model of 1932, which assumed a flat space and a zero 
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cosmological constant. Lemaître, on the other hand, assumed a positive 
cosmological constant by means of which he was able to avoid the age problem. 
 It is all-important that some kind of fossil is left over from the cosmic past, 
which otherwise would be inaccessible to us and therefore just a postulate one can 
believe in or not. It would have the same questionable ontological status as other 
universes in modern multiverse theories. In evidence-based courses in physics and 
astronomy students come to understand and accept the big bang picture by means 
of empirical evidence such as the cosmic microwave radiation and the abundance 
of helium in the universe. What matters is not so much the right scientific belief as 
it is to be able to justify these beliefs and distinguish them from ideas that are not 
adequately supported by evidence (Brickhouse et al. 2000, Brickhouse et al.  2002). 
Students learn that a theory must necessarily be supported by evidence and also 
that evidence depends on and is only meaningful in relation to the theory in 
question. The way students learn to accept the big bang corresponds to some 
extent to the historical situation in the period from about 1948 to 1965.  
 The celebrated discovery of the cosmic microwave background killed the 
already weakened rival steady state theory and turned the big bang theory into a 
successful standard theory of the universe.4 Although the best known of the 
cosmic fossils, the microwave background is not the only one and nor was it the 
most important in the historical development of cosmology. It may be less well 
known that the distribution of matter in the universe provides us with another 
and more easily accessible fossil. None of the 219 students questioned by Bailey et 
                                                          
4  The classical steady state theory was abandoned half a century ago and for this reason is 
mainly of historical interest. On the other hand, from a methodological and also an 
educational point of view it is an instructive example of how an attractive theory with 
great predictive power was eventually shot down by new observations. In addition, it 
illustrates the aesthetic and emotional appeal of a cosmological theory, a phenomenon 
which is not restricted to the past. While Kuhn (1998, p. 555) covers the essence of the 
steady state theory, other textbook authors choose to ignore it (Krauskopf & Beiser 2000).     
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al. (2012) referred to the chemical composition of the universe as evidence for the 
big bang, while 32 mentioned the expansion and three the cosmic microwave 
background as evidence.  
 The hypothesis that the distribution of matter reflects the cosmic past was 
first proposed in the late 1930s, when the first reliable data of the cosmic 
abundance of chemical elements were collected by the Norwegian geochemist 
Victor Goldschmidt. The general idea in this line of reasoning is that the nuclear 
species, or at least some of them, are the products of nuclear processes in the early 
phase of the universe. This was the guiding philosophy of Gamow and his 
associates Ralph Alpher and Robert Herman, who in the late 1940s developed it 
into a research programme sometimes known as ‘nuclear archaeology’ (Kragh 
1996, pp. 122-132). The apt phrase underlines the methodological similarity 
between this area of physical cosmology and ordinary historical archaeology. It 
refers to attempts to reconstruct the history of the universe by means of 
hypothetical cosmic or stellar processes and to test these by the resulting pattern of 
element abundances. Gamow was unable to account in this way for the heavier 
elements, but in collaboration with Alpher and Herman he succeeded in 
calculating the amount of helium in the universe to about 30% by weight, in 
reasonable agreement with observations. This early success of the big bang 
hypothesis was later much improved and extended to other light isotopes such as 
deuterium. 
  What matters is that by the late 1960s there was solid empirical evidence 
for the hot big bang, primarily in the form of the microwave background and the 
abundance of helium. This does not amount to a ‘proof’ of the big bang, but it does 
provide convincing evidence that makes it rational to accept the big bang picture 
(which does not imply that it is irrational not to accept it). Alternative 
cosmological models must, as a minimum, reproduce the empirical successes of 
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the standard big bang model and do it without assumptions of an ad hoc nature. 
To do so on the basis of non-big bang assumptions turns out to be exceedingly 
difficult. It was the main reason why the steady state model of the universe was 
abandoned in the late 1960s. The lack of successful rival models is yet another 
reason to have confidence in the big bang, if by no means to accept it as true in a 
literal sense. 
 Whether students follow an evidence-based approach that corresponds to 
the historical development or not, it is not enough that they can justify their belief 
in the big bang picture in terms of evidence for it. They also need to know what 
this picture is, more exactly. If not the students will believe in the big bang, 
knowing why they believe it but not knowing what they believe in. Several studies 
show that students have quite different views of the nature of the origin and 
evolution of the universe. According to a study of Swedish upper-secondary 
students of age 18-19 years, they conceive the big bang in a variety of ways: 
For example, there are students saying that the universe has always existed in some 
way. Others talk about a beginning with the Big Bang, but show that they do not 
view this as an absolute beginning of the universe. … In addition to the view 
ascribed above where the Big Bang is viewed as something happening to the whole 
of the universe, there are also some students who talk about the Big Bang as the 
origin of the earth and/or the sun. (Hansson & Redfors 2006, p. 359) 
One of the students described the big bang as an event ‘where an explosion made 
gases and particles spread out in space and then they attracted each other and 
formed suns’ (p. 366). Studies show consistently that the most common 
misconception of the big bang is to associate it with an explosion of pre-existing 
matter into empty space (Prather et al. 2003, Wallace et al. 2012, Bailey et al. 2012). 
Perhaps more surprisingly, only relatively few students connect the big bang to 
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the beginning of the cosmic expansion, and very few think of it as an explosion 
from nothing.  
 Although it is hard not to think of the big bang as some kind of explosion 
of pre-existing matter, it is important to make the students understand that this is 
at best a somewhat flawed metaphor. Incidentally, Lemaître himself  used the 
metaphor as early as 1931, when he spoke of his new big bang model as a 
‘fireworks theory’, thereby trying to visualize what happened in the cosmic past. 
Fireworks explode into the surrounding air, but there is nothing ‘outside’ that the 
universe can explode into. While an explosion occurs at some location, the bang of 
the past did not happen somewhere in the universe. It was the entire universe that 
‘exploded’ and thus the big bang happened everywhere. If this is hard to 
visualize, it is because it cannot be visualized. 
 It is also important to be aware that the qualitative meaning of the big 
bang is that long ago all distances, as given by the scale factor R(t), were nearly 
zero, after which R(t) increased rapidly. For some 14 billion years ago the universe 
was very compact, very hot and, in a sense, very small. The essence of the big 
bang is not a claim of an absolute beginning in some ‘singularity’ at t = 0, but a 
claim of a state of the universe, much earlier than and very different from the 
present state, that over long spans of time has evolved into the one we now 
observe. Another way of putting it is that the presently observed expansion 
started at some finite time ago in the cosmic past, so that the expanding universe 
can be ascribed a finite age. Note that this does not necessarily imply that the 
universe has a finite age (see also Sect. 6.4). Creation in an absolute and therefore 
metaphysical sense is not – and fortunately not – a part of the big bang scenario, 
just as little as an absolute origin of life is a necessary part of the neo-Darwinian 
evolution scenario.  
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5. The Concept of the Universe 
Although cosmology has undoubtedly developed into a proper and impressive 
physical science since the 1960s, it is not just another branch of physics or 
astronomy. Nor is it just astrophysics extended from the stars to the universe at 
large. No, it is a very special and potentially problematic science in which 
questions of a philosophical (and sometimes religious) nature cannot be clearly 
separated from scientific questions relating to observation and theory. To present 
cosmology to students without taking into regard its special nature is to present 
them with a narrow and distorted picture of the fascinating science of the 
universe. Questions of a philosophical nature are part and parcel of what 
cosmology is about, and they should be given due consideration also in 
educational contexts, if not at the expense of the scientific issues. This is a major 
reason why modern cosmology, including aspects of its history, should have a 
prominent role in science teaching and why it enters significantly in many courses 
for students not majoring in physics or astronomy.   
5.1. The Cosmological Principle 
Much of cosmology’s special and potentially problematic nature is independent 
not only of the big bang but also of the expansion of the universe. Indeed, being 
basically of a conceptual nature it is largely independent of modern scientific 
discoveries. A key problem, no less important today than it was in the time of 
Aristotle, is simply the unique domain of cosmology, this most peculiar concept of 
the universe. The standard definition of cosmology is something like ‘the science of 
the universe’, yet it is far from obvious that such a frightening concept as the 
universe can be the subject of scientific study. The relatively recent recognition 
that this can be done, and that even the universe at large is not foreign land to 
science, is one of the marvels of the modern physical sciences. 
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 Among the epistemic problems that face a science of the universe is that 
cosmological knowledge seems to be conditioned by certain principles or 
assumptions that are completely unverifiable and for this reason may appear to be 
metaphysical rather than physical (Ellis 1984). The best known of these principles 
is the so-called cosmological principle, namely the generally held assumption that 
the universe is homogeneous and isotropic on a very large scale. It is sometimes 
referred to as the extended Copernican principle, a rather unfortunate name given 
that Copernicus’ universe had the Sun as its fixed and unique centre. First 
explicitly formulated in 1932, the cosmological principle lies at the heart of all 
relativistic standard models, but it is not restricted to models governed by the 
general theory of relativity. Indeed, when British cosmologist Edward Milne 
introduced it in 1932, it was in connection with his own theory of the expanding 
universe which was entirely different from the theory governed by general 
relativity. The principle assumes that the vast ocean of unobservable regions of the 
universe is similar to the region we have empirical access to, a region that may 
well be an infinitesimal part of the entire universe. What is the epistemic status of 
the cosmological principle? Is it a necessary precondition for cosmology, or is it 
merely a convenience that may be accepted or not?  
 The cosmological principle does have an empirical basis in so far that it 
roughly agrees with observations, but observations can say nothing about the 
structure of the universe far beyond the Hubble region, not to mention the cosmic 
horizon. Extrapolations much beyond this scale are necessarily hypothetical as 
they rest on an assumption of global uniformity that can never be verified. One 
might also say that they rest on ‘faith’, although the faith in the global validity of 
the cosmological principle is supported by local observations and therefore quite 
different from ‘blind faith’. If cosmology rests on an unverifiable and perhaps 
metaphysical principle, can it still claim to be scientific? This is not to suggest that 
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the cosmological principle is in fact metaphysical, but to suggest that it is worth 
contemplating the status of the principle and to discuss it also in a teaching 
context rather than merely present it as a reasonable if unprovable assumption 
(Kuhn 1998, p. 551).  
 The instinct of many students majoring in science is to react with hostility 
and distrust to terms such as ‘faith’ and ‘metaphysics’. (For students not majoring 
in science, see Shipman et al. 2002). Yet, because something is ultimately a matter 
of faith it does not imply that it is irrational, unscientific or arbitrary. There is an 
element of belief in most scientific ideas. It is important to recognize that 
unverifiability is not a great methodological sin that automatically deprives a 
theory or field its scientific status. In fact, students are well aware of high-status 
scientific theories that cannot be verified, although they may never have thought 
of them as theories that, in a manner of speaking, rest on belief. 
 Several of our commonly accepted laws of physics can be said to be 
cosmological in nature in so far that they are claimed to be true all over the 
universe and in any patch of cosmic space-time. Newton’s law of gravitation 
speaks of the attractive force between any two masses in the universe, and the law 
of energy conservation is valid for all processes at any time in the universe. They 
can reasonably be considered statements relating to the universe at large and for 
this reason implicitly of a cosmological nature. Of course, neither these two laws 
nor other similar laws can be verified experimentally. The moral is that students 
have no reason to fear unverifiability in cosmology, since we have to live with this 
feature anyway. On the other hand, unfalsifiability is a different matter.  
 Contrary to what some philosophers have argued (Munitz 1986), the 
cosmological uniformity principle and similar principles are not of an a priori 
nature, that is, true by necessity. The cosmological principle is a simplifying 
assumption that could be proved wrong by observation. In that case it would have 
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to be abandoned, but this would not make cosmology impossible, only more 
complicated. There are plenty of theoretical cosmological models that do not 
presuppose homogeneity or isotropy. The case exemplifies the important 
distinction between verifiability and falsifiability that is a central message in 
Popperian philosophy of science. That global uniformity principles of this kind are 
indeed falsifiable is further illustrated by the ‘perfect cosmological principle’ upon 
which the now defunct steady state theory was based. This principle extended the 
cosmological principle to the temporal dimension, namely, by claiming that there 
is no privileged time in the history of the universe any more than there is a 
privileged position. When the steady state theory was put in the grave in the 
1960s, so was the perfect cosmological principle. 
5.2. The Uniqueness of the Universe 
The universe does not only stretch beyond the observable region, it is also, at least 
according to the ordinary meaning of the term, a unique concept (Ellis 1999). If the 
universe by definition comprises everything of a physical nature, space and time 
included, there can only be one universe. Contrary to ordinary physics, which 
operates with objects and phenomena which are local and of which there are 
many, the universe is not a member or instance of a class of objects. Newton could 
establish his inverse-square law of gravitation because there are many bodies that 
gravitate. By observing and experimenting with different initial conditions he and 
later physicists could confirm the validity of the law. But not so with respect to the 
universe, where the initial conditions are fixed and unchangeable. We cannot re-
run the universe with the same or altered conditions to see what would happen if 
they were different. It seems to follow that we cannot establish proper 
cosmological laws of the universe comparable to the ordinary laws of physics, for 
we cannot test any such proposed law except in terms of being consistent with a 
singular ‘object’, the observed universe. 
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 Since we use laws to explain things, such as explaining the falling apple as 
an instance of the law of gravity or the energy generated by the Sun as an instance 
of the laws of quantum physics, it may seem that the domain of cosmology is 
beyond explanation in the causal-nomological sense normally used in physics. To 
put it differently, whereas in local physics law-governed and contingent 
properties can be distinguished, this may not be possible in cosmology. Does it 
follow that the universe – the domain of cosmology – is beyond explanation? The 
question was discussed by René Descartes and his contemporaries in the 
seventeenth century, and it has continued to attract attention from both 
philosophers and cosmologists. According to Descartes, the divine mechanical 
laws guaranteed that the original chaos, whatever its structure and initial 
conditions, would evolve into our universe or one indistinguishable from it. 
Newton, on the other hand, insisted that the universe cannot be fully understood 
by the laws of mechanics alone. Descartes’ ‘indifference principle’ continues to 
play a role in modern cosmology, except that the laws are no longer seen as 
mechanical only (McMullin 1993).  
 There are ways to avoid the pessimistic conclusion that the universe is 
beyond explanation. One strategy is simply to deny the uniqueness of the universe 
by postulating the existence of many others (Sect. 6.1). Another solution is to recall 
that there are other forms of explanation than those used in the standard 
deductive-nomological scheme. Because cosmology is a non-nomological science, 
it does not follow that it is impossible to account for the present state of the 
universe. Thus, to explain the fact that the present temperature of the microwave 
background is about 2.7 K we do not need a law of the universe or an ensemble of 
universes we can compare ours with. We can and do offer an explanation – not a 
causal one, but a historical or genetic explanation – by accounting for how the 
background radiation cooled with the expansion of the universe.  
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6. Unfinished Businesses 
Cosmology of the twenty-first century is in some respects an unfinished business 
that may provide students with a rare insight in science in vivo. Not only are there 
important scientific questions that are not solved yet, most notably the nature of 
dark matter and dark energy, there are also questions of old vintage that may 
belong as much to philosophy as to science and about which we do not even know 
whether they are answerable or not. Many students are naturally curious about 
the kind of borderline questions that cosmology present us with, and teachers 
should do what they can to satisfy their curiosity. Students should be confronted 
with problems of this kind and be stimulated to think about them in a critical and 
rational way. They should not be dissuaded from asking questions even though 
these may appear to be naïve – maybe they are not so naïve after all. Modern 
physical cosmology is a wonderful resource for enlightenment and discussion of 
questions that relate to the limits of science. Contrary to what is the case in most 
other sciences, such questions are integrated parts of the science of the universe 
understood broadly. In general science courses dealing with cosmology it will be 
natural to introduce at least some of the issues. 
6.1. Many Universes? 
A typical textbook definition is that ‘the visible universe is the largest astronomical 
structure of which we have any knowledge’ (Arny 2004, p. 9). This is a reasonable 
and operational definition, but why restrict cosmology to the study of the visible 
universe? There surely is something behind it. In the more general and ambitious 
sense adopted by some cosmologists the universe is taken to be ‘everything that 
exists’. If so, it makes no sense to speak of other universes. Nonetheless, this is 
what several theoretical cosmologists do nowadays, where the question of the 
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definition of the universe has been reconsidered as part of the controversy over 
the ‘multiverse’, the hypothesis that there is a multitude of different universes of 
which the one we observe is only a single member (Carr & Ellis 2008, Kragh 
2011b). This ongoing controversy has many interesting aspects, not least that 
critics have questioned the scientific nature of the multiverse hypothesis and thus 
reopened the old question of whether cosmology, or some versions of cosmology, 
belongs to physics or metaphysics. On the other hand, advocates of the multiverse 
argue that it is a scientific idea and that it follows from, or is strongly suggested 
by, recent developments within string theory and inflation cosmology. Although 
the multiverse cannot be tested directly, they claim that it leads to testable 
consequences. 
 The existence of a cosmic horizon beyond which we will never be able to 
see or otherwise get information from, not even in principle, is not a new insight. 
As early as 1931 Eddington pointed out that the accelerated expansion of the 
closed Lemaître-Eddington universe would eventually lead to ‘a number of 
disconnected universes no longer bearing any physical relation to one another’ 
(Eddington 1931, p. 415). This kind of multiverse is relatively innocent, since the 
different universes, although causally separated, inhabit the same space-time. 
More extreme and more speculative is the modern idea of a huge number of 
disparate universes, each of them with its own physical laws and constants of 
nature (and with ours being perhaps the only one with intelligent life). We 
obviously cannot have empirically based knowledge about the content and 
properties of these other worlds, nor can we establish their existence 
observationally. The numerous other worlds may exist or not, but if the question 
cannot be decided by means of experiment and observation does it belong to 
science? 
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 The recent controversy over the universe may well be used in the teaching 
of introductory cosmology as it does not rely on advanced theories but is 
essentially of a qualitative and philosophical nature. A recommendable source, 
most relevant also for the purpose of teaching, can be found in a discussion 
between George Ellis and Bernard Carr in the journal Astronomy & Geophysics 
(Carr & Ellis 2008). This illuminating source has for some years been used in 
courses in philosophy of science for undergraduate science students at Aarhus 
University, and with considerable success. It works very well and provokes much 
good discussion among the students. 
6.2. Infinite Space 
The problem of the spatial extension of the universe is another of those 
cosmological questions that have been discussed since Greek antiquity and that 
we still do not know the answer to. While Einstein’s original universe of 1917 was 
positively curved and with a definite volume, corresponding to a curvature radius 
of only about 107 light-years, the expanding Einstein-de Sitter model of 1932 
assumed a flat and therefore infinite space. The same was the case of the steady 
state universe, where a zero curvature parameter k = 0 follows from the perfect 
cosmological principle. Indirect and model-dependent measurements of the 
curvature of cosmic space did not lead to a definite answer, but the present 
consensus model (including inflation and dark energy) strongly favours a flat 
universe of infinite extent. Assuming the cosmological principle, this implies a 
universe with an infinite number of objects in it, whether these being electrons or 
galactic clusters. 
 Students may tend to think of infinity as just a hugely large number, but 
(as Newton was well aware of) there is a world of difference between the 
extremely large and the infinitely large. Actual infinities are notoriously 
problematical, leading to all kinds of highly bizarre consequences. The general 
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attitude of modern cosmologists is to ignore the troublesome philosophical 
problems of actual infinities and speak of the infinite universe as just an 
indefinitely large universe, not unlike the students’ intuition. Only rarely do they 
reflect on the weird consequences of the actual infinite – but perhaps they should. 
Ellis is one of the relatively few cosmologists who take the infinite cosmos 
seriously, suggesting that the infinities may not be real after all, indeed cannot be 
real. Ellis and his collaborators argue that physical quantities cannot be truly 
infinite and that infinite sets of astronomical objects have no place in cosmology. If 
such quantities formally turn up in a theory or model, it almost certainly means 
that the theory is wrong. Infinity, they emphasize, ‘is not the sort of property that 
can be physically realized in an entity, an object, or a system, like a definite 
number can’ (Stoeger, Ellis & Kirchner 2008, p. 17).  
 Although an infinite universe follows from some cosmological models, we 
will never know whether the universe is in fact infinite. Observations and theory 
indicate a flat space, but observations are limited to the visible universe. It is only 
by assuming the cosmological uniformity principle that we can extrapolate to the 
universe at large. Moreover, we can never know observationally whether k = 0 
precisely, only that k varies between the limits ± Δk corresponding to the inevitable 
observational uncertainties. This observational asymmetry between flat and 
curved space was pointed out by the Russian mathematician Nikolai Lobachevsky 
as early as 1829, a century before the expanding universe. It is worth noticing that 
although the idea of curved space only was adopted by physicists and 
astronomers with Einstein’s general theory of relativity, as a mathematical idea it 
goes back to the first half of the nineteenth century. 
6.3. The Enigma of Creation 
The traditional version of the big bang theory inevitably invites questions of a 
philosophical and to some extent religious nature concerning the origin of 
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everything. Although the big bang model is not really a model of absolute 
beginning or creation, but a cosmic evolutionary scenario, it would be artificial to 
ignore these questions and simply dismiss them as unscientific. Unscientific they 
may be, but they are no less natural and fascinating for that. Teachers can keep 
them out of astronomy and general science courses, but that would be to betray 
the curiosity and natural instincts of the students. Moreover, questions concerning 
cosmic creation have a long a glorious history which makes interesting 
connections between the history of science and the history of ideas, philosophy 
and religious thought. Whether one likes it or not, the creation of the physical 
universe is part of the world view of most cultures, and for this reason alone it 
should not be ignored in science courses. Fortunately there is a rich literature on 
philosophical, political and religious world views and their place in science 
education (Matthews 2009).  
 The problem with creation in a cosmological context is that if we conceive 
the big bang as an absolute beginning at t = 0, then a causal scientific explanation 
of the creation event is impossible. After all, a cause must come before the effect, 
and there is no ‘before’. Current cosmology has traced the history of the universe 
back in time to the inflationary period which is supposed to have occurred at t = 
10-34 s or thereabout. It is often assumed that the cosmic past can be traced even 
farther back to the Planck time at t = 10-43 s (and there are even speculative pre-
Planck theories). But however close calculations may bring us to the magical 
moment t = 0, it seems in principle impossible to account for the creation event 
itself. To say that the universe was created in a space-time singularity is a mere 
play with words, since the singularity is mathematical abstraction devoid of 
physical content. Physics did not exist at t = 0 and it makes no sense to speak of 
physical mechanisms where even the concepts of cause and effect cannot be 
defined.  
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 In spite of the rhetoric of some cosmologists, there are no scientific 
theories that explain the origin of the universe from ‘nothing’ and there never will 
be such theories. The concept of nothingness or absolute void has a rich history 
(Genz 1999) that recently has become relevant to science, not least after the 
discovery of the dark energy that is generally identified with the vacuum energy 
density as given by the cosmological constant and interpreted in terms of 
quantum mechanics. However, the modern quantum vacuum is entirely different 
from absolute nothingness. There cannot possibly be a scientific answer to what 
nothingness is, and yet it does not therefore follow that the concept is 
meaningless.  
 A major reason why big bang cosmology has been and to some extent still 
is controversial in the eyes of the public, is that it may be seen as a scientific 
version of Genesis or at least to provide scientific justification for a divinely 
created world. This misguided view was endorsed by pope Pius XII in 1951 
(Kragh 1996, pp. 256-259) and is still popular in some circles. Although this is not 
the place to discuss the complex relations between cosmology and religion 
(Halvorsen & Kragh 2010), it appears that some of these questions are suited for 
discussions with and among students and should not necessarily be kept out of 
the physics classroom. Courses that aim to establish a dialogue between science 
and religion have existed for some time, and in some of them cosmology enters 
prominently (Shipman et al. 2002). The issue is also mentioned in Kuhn (1998), a 
textbook which includes a brief and admirably clear exposition of the relationship 
between cosmology and religious faith: 
If we use God as an explanation for the big bang, there would be no reason to look 
further for a natural explanation. Use of supernatural explanations would shut 
down science. … If science relied on a creator to explain the inexplicable, there 
would be nowhere to go, no way to prove that explanation wrong. The question 
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would have already been settled. … Science does not deny the existence of God. 
God is simply outside its realm. (Kuhn 1998, p. 557) 
While much attention is paid to the origin of the universe, the other end of the 
cosmic time scale is rarely considered a question of great importance. And yet 
Einstein’s equations of relativistic cosmology are symmetric in time, telling us not 
only about the distant past but also about the remote future. Will the universe ever 
come to an end? If so, what kind of end? In the late nineteenth century these 
questions were eagerly discussed in relation to the so-called heat death 
supposedly caused by the increase of entropy in the universe, and recently they 
have been reconsidered within the framework of modern physics and cosmology. 
The new subfield known as ‘physical eschatology’ is concerned, among other 
things, with the final state of life and everything else (Kragh 2011b, pp. 325-353). 
Parts of physical eschatology are controversial and highly speculative, yet it is a 
subject that is likely to appeal to many students and that they should know about. 
As the birth of the universe relates to religious dogmas, so does it death.  
6.4. A Universe without a Beginning 
In his last book, The Demon-Haunted World, the prominent astronomer and science 
popularizer and educator Carl Sagan pointed out that science might conceivably 
demonstrate the universe to be infinitely old. He suggested that ‘this is the one 
conceivable finding of science that could disprove a Creator – because an infinitely 
old universe would never have been created’ (Sagan 1997, p. 265). On the face of it 
Sagan’s assertion may appear convincing, perhaps even self-evident, but it is 
based on a misunderstanding that conflates the scientific notion of ‘finite age’ with 
the theological notion of ‘creation’. Theologians and Christian philosophers agree 
that even an infinitely old universe would have to be created, in the sense of being 
continuously sustained, and that it would in no way pose problems for faith. Even 
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if the universe had existed in an infinity of time, we could still ask for the reason of 
its existence, or why it was created. 
 We have very good reason to believe in the big bang, but we have no good 
reason to believe that this is how the universe ultimately came into being. 
Concepts such as cosmic origin and time are difficult, not only conceptually but 
also for semantic reasons. Thus, we would presumably think that whereas the 
steady state universe of Hoyle and others had always existed, this is not the case 
with the finite-age big bang universe. The two statements ‘the universe has a finite 
age’ and ‘the universe has always existed’ appear to be contradictory, but in 
reality they may both be true. To say that the universe has always existed is to say 
that it existed whenever time existed. The word ‘always’ is a temporal term that 
presupposes time. Since it is hard to imagine time without a universe, it makes 
sense to speak of a big bang universe which has always existed. The phrase ‘the 
universe has always existed’ reduces to a tautology. This observation is more than 
just a philosophical nicety, as illustrated by one of the questions posed to students 
in a questionnaire: ‘Does the universe have an age, or has it always existed‘ (Bailey 
et al. 2012). Several of the students, we are told, ‘gave a contradictory response, 
such as “the universe has always existed: it is billions of years old”’. As argued, 
the answer is not really contradictory. 
 Until recently it was taken for granted that a universe of finite age implies 
an absolute cosmic beginning of some kind. The traditional answer to the 
supposedly naïve question of what there was before the beginning in the big bang 
has been to dismiss or ridicule it as an illegitimate and meaningless question. For 
how can there be something ‘before’ the beginning of time? But there is no reason 
to ridicule the question if it is recognized that the big bang event at t = 0 need not 
mark the beginning of time.  
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 During the last two decades an increasing number of cosmologists have 
argued that the big bang picture does not preclude a past eternity in the form of, 
for example, one or more earlier universes. Most theories of quantum gravity 
operate with a non-singular smallest volume, which makes it possible to extend 
cosmic time through the t = 0 barrier at least in a formal sense.5 There exists 
presently a handful of such theories, which are all speculative to varying degrees 
but nonetheless are considered serious scientific hypotheses. To mention but one 
example, according to so-called loop quantum cosmology the universe was not 
created a finite time ago but exists eternally. There was a big bang, of course, but 
in the form of a well-described transition of the universe from a contracting to an 
expanding phase. The space of loop quantum cosmology is discrete on a very 
small scale, which has the observable consequence that photons of very high 
energy should travel faster than those of low energy. 
 Did the universe have an absolute beginning in time or not? The most 
honest answer is probably that we do not know and perhaps cannot ever know. It 
may be one of those questions about which we cannot even tell whether it is 
meaningful or not or whether it belongs to science or not. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The cosmological world view of the twenty-first century, largely identical to the 
standard big bang theory, is to a considerable extent what the Copernican world 
system was in the seventeenth century. Just as this system was not only a new 
theory of astronomy, but also carried with it wider implications related to 
                                                          
5   It is far from obvious that the symbol t, as it appears in the equations describing the 
very early universe near or before the Planck time t = 10-43 s, can be ascribed a well-
defined physical meaning (Rugh & Zinkernagel 2009). The meaning of time is even less 
clear in theories of quantum cosmology describing the universe before t = 0.  
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philosophy, religion and social order, so the modern picture of the universe 
cannot be easily separated from extra-scientific considerations. Such 
considerations, be they of a philosophical, conceptual or religious nature, should 
to some extent appear also in the teaching of science and do it in a qualified and 
critical manner.  
 One of the important aims of science education is to bring home the lesson 
that although science provides us with reliable and privileged knowledge of 
nature, it does not answer all questions that are worth asking. This lesson emerges 
with particular force from the study of cosmology. It may be expressed more 
poetically with a famous quotation from Shakespeare’s Hamlet: ‘There are more 
things in heaven and Earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy’. 
Recall that at the time of Shakespeare, the term ‘philosophy’ had a meaning 
corresponding to our ‘science’.  
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